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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
Comment on Recent Decisions
AGENCY-AGENT'S LIABILITY TO THIRD PERSONS-MISFEASANCE AND NON-
FEASANCE.-The defendant railroad company employed one Poppell, a citizen
and resident of Georgia, as foreman in charge of the right of way adjacent
to the land of the plaintiff. Poppell entered into performance of his duty to
clear the weeds and other ignitable substances from the right of way, but
failed to clear that section proximate to plaintiff's land. As a result, sparks
from a passing locomotive enkindled the dry weeds, and the fire spread to
the plaintiff's premises causing great damage. In an action in the state
court against both the railroad and the agent there was a motion for a
change of venue to the federal court since the railroad was a foreign corpo-
ration and the cause of action was for over $3000. Held; reversing the state
court, that the plaintiff has no cause of action against the agent since his
act was one of nonfeasance and not misfeasance. Change of venue granted.
Knight v. Att. Coast Line R. Co. (C. C. A. 5, Oct. 1934) 73 F. (2) 76.
There can be no doubt that an agent who violates a duty owing to a third
person is liable to such person for the consequences of his tortious acts,
whether they be malfeasance, misfeasance, or nonfeasance. Bannigan V.
Woodbury (1909) 158 Mich. 206, 122 N. W. 531; Humphreys Tunnel & Min.
Co. v. Franlk (1909) 46 Colo. 524, 105 Pac. 1093; 2 C. J. 824, sec. 498. This
simple rule based on ordinary tort law has been perverted by text writers,
and through such influence an artificial nicety has entered the books. The
rule thus created is that an agent is liable to third parties for misfeasance,
but not for nonfeasance, since in the latter case his only duty is to his prin-
cipal based on privity of contract; there being no privity between the agent
and third persons. Story on Agency (1882), sec. 308; Wharton on Agency
(1876), sec. 535; Dunlap's Paley's Agency (1847), sec. 396; Ewell's, Evans
on Agency (1879), sec. 328. Modern scholars of the law are agreed that
the rule enunciated by the above writers is the result of a misinterpretation
of the dicta in a dissenting opinion by Lord Holt in Lane v. Cotton (1701)
12 Mod. 488; 88 Eng. Rep. 1466, which case did not have before it the
liability of an agent to a third party. See Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v.
Knight (1933) 48 Ga. App. 53. The leading case of Delaney v. Rochercau
& Co. (1882) 34 La. Ann. 1123, 44 Am. Rep. 456, nevertheless follows this
mistaken view, and cites for its sole authority the textbooks which are re-
sponsible for it. Carey v. Rochereau (C. C. A. La., 1883) 16 F. 87, which
other federal courts blindly follow, adopted the rule in the Delaney Case,
supra. Kelley v. Robinson (D. C. E. D. Mo. 1920) 262 F. 695; accord.
Murray v. Usher et al. (1889) 117 N. Y. 548.
The more modern cases refuse to be misled in this manner, and to es-
cape the obvious injustice of the rule, have restricted the meaning of non-
feasance to the cases where the agent fails to enter into performance of the
contract with his principal, but after the agent actually enters upon the
performance of his work any tortious act which he does, whether by omis-
sion or commission, is misfeasance. Orcutt v. Century Bldg. Co. (1907)
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210 Mo. 424, 99 S. W. 1062; Brower v. Northern P. R. Co. (1910) 109 Minn.
385, 124 N. W. 10; Williams v. Dean (1907) 134 Iowa 216, 111 N. W. 931;
Southern R. Co. v. Grizzle (1906) 124 Ga. 735, 53 S. E. 244. Other author-
ities escape the confusion resulting from such a distinction by declaring
that an agent who assumes the control of property is charged with the duty
of so managing and using it as not to injure the property or person of an-
other; thus creating a duty in law making the agent liable to third persons
for misfeasance and "nonfeasance." Tippecanoe Loan & Trust Co. v. Jester
(1913) 180 Ind. 357, 101 N. E. 915, L. R. A. 1915E, 721.
At most, the foregoing limitations are inadequate. First, because the
failure of the agent to enter into performance of the contract after lulling
his principal into inactivity, may cause the injury to a third person. Sec-
ondly, the injury may result from an agency which does not allow the
agent full control over the principal's property. The best means of escape
from Lane v. Cotton, supra, and the error into which its misapplication lead
the courts would seem to be to adopt the rule proposed by the American
Law Institute: "An agent who undertakes to act for the principal under
such conditions that some action is necessary for the protection of the person
of others or of their tangible things is subject to liability to such others for
physical harm to them or to their things caused by his undertaking and
subsequent failure to act, if the need for action is so immediate or emergent
that withdrawal from the undertaking is no longer possible without un-
reasonable risk to them, and the agent should so realize." American Law
Institute, Restatement of Agency (1933), see. 354.
H. A. G. '35.
BANKRUPTCY-LEAsE TERMINATED BY SUCH-PROVABLE CLAiMS.-By the
terms of the lease, the filing of a petition in bankruptcy against the lesee
was to be deemed a breach of the lease, terminating it ipso facto and with-
out entry or other action by the lessor. A further provision gave the lessor
as damages for said breach an amount equal to the amount of the rent re-
served for the residue of the term less the fair rental value. The bank-
ruptcy petition was filed against the lessee prior to the termination of the
lease. In an action to establish a claim for damages under the lease, held,
affirming the judgment of the Circuit Court (69 F (2d) 90) that the lessor
had a provable claim under the Bankruptcy Act. Irving Trust Co. v. Perry
-U. S.-, (U. S. Law Week, December 4, 1934).
"Debts of the bankrupt may be proved and allowed against his estate
which are a fixed liability . . . absolutely owing at the time of the filing of
the petition against him." Bankruptcy Act 1898, ch. 541, sec. 63 a (1);
30 Stat. 562.
Contingent claims cannot be liquidated or proven. 2 Collier on Bankruptcy
(12th Ed. 1921), 978. In re Imperial Brewing Co. (W. D. Mo. 1906) 143
Fed. 579. Accordingly, rent which the bankrupt has agreed to pay and
which is to accrue subsequent to the filing of the petition in bankruptcy
does not constitute a provable claim; it is not a "fixed liability" under sec-
tion 63 a (1) nor an existing demand, but both the existence and the
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